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This paper  studies  a dynamic  insurance  problem  with bilateral  asymmetric  information  and 
balanced  budgets.  There  are two infinitely-lived  agents  in our model, both risk averse,  and each 
has an i.i.d. random  endowment  stream  which  is unobservable  to the other.  In each period,  each 
agent  must  have  a non-negative  consumption  and  together  they  must  consume  the entire  aggregate 
endowment.  Dynamic  incentive  compatibility  in the Nash sense  is defined.  We give sufficient  and 
necessary  conditions  for the existence  of a constrained  efficient  contract.  We show that a con- 
strained  efficient  contract  can be characterized  in a Bellman  equation.  We demonstrate  that the 
long-run  distribution  of expected  utilities  of each agent is not degenerate.  We also develop  an 
algorithm  for computing  the efficient  contract  and, in a numerical  example,  we find that the 
consumption  processes  of the agents  form  stationary  Markov  chains. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies a dynamic insurance  problem between two risk-averse  agents with 
bilateral  asymmetric  information  and balanced  budgets.  The two agents, both infinitely- 
lived  in a pure  exchange  economy,  face idiosyncratic  risks  in the endowments  they receive. 
Specifically,  at each date, they each draw independently  a stochastic,  privately  observed 
endowment.  The endowment  is perishable,  and there exist no opportunities  for the two 
agents to borrow  and lend with outside  parties.  The two agents  hence  are constrained  to 
consume  the aggregate  endowment  they  receive  at each  date. Being  risk  averse,  they would 
wish to pool their endowments  together.  But this is impeded  by the private  information 
about the endowments  they receive.  The problem  that the two agents face, therefore,  is 
to design a feasible trading  mechanism  which achieves Pareto efficiency  subject  to the 
constraint  of incentive  compatibility:  they must both be given the incentives  to truthfully 
reveal  their endowments. 
The problem  we study here is closely related  to the dynamic  insurance  literature  led 
by Townsend  (1982), Spear  and Srivastava  (1987), and Thomas  and Worrall  (1990), who 
model relationships  between  a principal  and a single  risk-averse  agent; and Green (1987) 
and Phelan  and Townsend  (1990), who examine  relationships  between  a principal  and a 
continuum  of risk-averse  agents. In these models, as in standard  principal-agent  models 
such as Holmstrom  (1979), Allen (1985), and Radner (1985), a key feature  is that the 
principal,  who typically  has access to credit  markets,  can serve  as a residual  claimant  to 
permit  violation  of the budget-balancing  constraint.  In a recent  contribution,  Atkeson  and 
Lucas (1992) extend the literature  by looking at a closed economy where a period-by- 
period  aggregate  resource  constraint  is imposed.  In Atkeson  and Lucas,  the total  consump- 
tion handed out by the principal  each period to the population cannot exceed some 
constant  endowment  level. 
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This paper goes one step further  in the direction  started  by Atkeson and Lucas. In 
the  model  studied  in Atkeson  and Lucas  it is feasible  for the constant  aggregate  endowment 
not to be consumed  since  the principal  can always  retain  a positive  residual.  In our model, 
by contrast,  the two agents are constrained  to consume  the entire (uncertain)  aggregate 
endowment  in each period. Therefore  in our model the role played by the principal  as 
residual  claimant  is completely  discarded.  Another  important  difference  between  our  model 
and that of Atkeson and Lucas is that Atkeson and Lucas focus on multiplicative  taste 
shocks  rather  than  endowment  shocks.  Multiplicative  taste  shocks  can sometimes  be inter- 
preted  as endowment  shocks,  for example,  when utility  is exponential.  In this case, how- 
ever, the optimal  contract  may require  the principal  to take from an agent more than he 
claims to have. This feature  is absent  in our model. Instead,  we focus directly  on endow- 
ment shocks and we impose in a period-by-period  feasibility  constraint  that the optimal 
contract  does not take from an agent more than he claims  to have received. 
The model  is presented  in Section  2 where  feasible  and incentive  compatible  contracts 
are defined and the problem of constrained  efficiency  is formulated.  In Section 3, we 
demonstrate  that a constrained  efficient  contract  that delivers  ex ante expected  utility V 
to agent  2 exists  if and only if V  is in some compact  set we denote  as (Dv.  Then,  in Section 
4, we show  that a constrained  efficient  contract  can be characterized  in a Bellman  equation. 
Our  Bellman  equation  is quite  different  from  those  studied  by earlier  writers  in the dynamic 
insurance  literature.  Among other  things,  a unique  feature  of our Bellman  equation  is that 
the value function  enters  into the incentive  constraints. 
A common  important  result  in Green  (1987), Atkeson  and Lucas  (1992),  and Thomas 
and  Worrall  (1990) is, for efficient  risk  sharing,  the expected  utility  of each  agent  converges 
to the minimum  level in the set of possible expected  utilities  with probability  one. This 
however  is not the case here.  In Section  5, we show that the expected  utility  of each agent 
converges  to every  level in the set of possible  expected  utilities  with probability  zero. We 
also show in this section that the constraint  efficient  contract  is non-trivial  and strictly 
dominates  autarky. 
As our model is not amenable  to analytic solutions, an algorithm  for numerical 
computation  of an efficient  contract is discussed  in Section 6. Then in Section 7, an 
example,  where  utility is exponential  and endowment  takes on two values, is computed. 
Among other things, we find that in this example, each agent's consumption path 
forms a  stationary Markov chain. Section 8 concludes the paper with several short 
remarks. 
2. THE MODEL 
Consider  the following economy. Time is discrete  and lasts forever:  t = 1, 2  ....  There 
are  two infinitely-lived  agents,  indexed  by a= 1, 2. Both  agents  are  risk  averse  and  maximize 
their  ex ante expected  life-time  utilities,  and discount  the future  by the common  discount 
factor  ,B  E  (0, 1). There  is one perishable  good which  the agents  consume.  The  instantaneous 
utility  function  u: R-+R, shared  by both agents,  is assumed  to satisfy  the following  condi- 
tions: u'(c)  > 0, u"(c)  <0, for all c ?0.  At each date, each agent has a random  endowment 
ea  drawn from a finite set 0  = {OI,  02,  ..  O.n},  where 0< <O02<  .  .  .  < On  .  We assume 
that e' and et are identically  and independently  distributed  and Prob  {e,  =  Oi} =  ir  >0,  for 
all t_ 1, all Oi  -S and all a. 
There  exist  no opportunities  for the two agents  to borrow  or lend  with outside  parties. 
Self-imposed  punishments,  such as the bonfires  discussed  in Holmstrom  (1982) and the 
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the two agents to commit to these strategies.  Since endowments  are perishable,  the two 
agents are constrained  to consume  the entire aggregate  endowment  at each date. Being 
risk averse,  they would wish to pool their  endowments  together.  But this is impeded  by a 
problem  of information  asymmetry.  At each date, the history  of realized  endowments  of 
each agent is his private  information. 
Given the information  structure,  any possible trades  in our model are to be based 
solely upon what has been reported by the two agents. For all t>  1, we denote by 
gat=  (rl',  .  .  .  , 4,) agent a's reported history of endowments up to date t, where r4  is agent 
a's reported  endowment  at date t. Next, let the overall history  of reported  endowments 
up to date t be denoted  by 
gt  =(g  g2t)  = (r1, .  .  r,)E(e  x  )t= Ht, 
where rt  =  (r,  r,), and H' is the set of possible histories up to date t. Let Ho  0. 
Definition  1.  A co-insurance  contract a  is a sequence  of functions {u,}t.=1  where 
S,: H'-+R.  Call cr,(g')  the amount of good transferred  from agent I to agent 2 at date t, 
conditional on reported history gt up to date t. 
Therefore  under  contract a, at date t, agent 1 will consume -a(g')  + e,  and agent 
2  (gt)  +  e2.  Note  that the above way of defining a contract automatically ensures that 
the two agents will consume  exactly the entire aggregate  endowment  at each date. Also 
note that the case where  cr,= O  independent  of date and history  corresponds  to autarky. 
We now turn to define the feasibility of a contract. Let a,(gt-1,  (0,  O))  be the date 
t net transfer  of endowment  from agent I to agent 2 if reported  history  up to date t -  I 
has been  g'-'  and date t current  reports  by the two agents  are Oi  and Oj  respectively. 
Definition 2.  A co-insurance  contract  a is feasible  if for all t> 1 and g'-  eH'  ', 
-_0 <at(g 
- 
(0i,  O,))?<0i,  V(0i, 01)e02  (1) 
Condition (1) simply  requires  that, at any date, the contract  will not take from any 
agent  more  than  he claims  to have  received.  Therefore,  suppose  the two agents  both report 
truthfully  about their endowments  at each date, as they will under the conditions of 
incentive  compatibility  to be given shortly,  then both agents  will consume  a non-negative 
amount  of the consumption  good. 
We proceed  now to tackle the issue of incentive  compatibility.  Basically,  a contract 
cr is said to be perfectly  incentive  compatible  if, at any date, conditional  on any history, 
the continuation  profile of  af is such that truthful  reporting  strategies  by both agents 
concerning all future endowments constitute a  Nash equilibrium.  By modifying the 
approach  in Green (1987), and Spear  and Srivastava  (1987), this can be formulated  in a 
recursive  manner.  The idea is to decompose  the super-incentive  problem  that each agent 
faces at the beginning  of each date into a sequence  of one-step  incentive  problems,  each 
associated  with a single  future  date. Some additional  notation  is needed  here. Denote by 
U(oIg'',  (0,, Oj))  the date t expected  utility  (discounted  to date t + 1) that the continua- 
tion profile (from date t +1  on) of  af will deliver to agent 1, conditional  on reported 
history (g'-  1, (0,,  Oj)) up to date t and that both will report truthfully from date t + 1 on. 
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Definition 3.  A contract af is incentive compatible if, for all t >1,  gtI-  H'  ,  and 
for all (0s,  Oj)C02  and  OkGO, 
U(-Cr1(gt-  I,  (0i,  0j))  +  ?i)  +  p  QU(Cg'  1,  (0i,  OM) 
_>U(-  at(g  ,  (Ok,  Oj))  +  0 i)  +  P  U  I  gt-1  (?k  ?  )),  (2) 
and, for all (0,,  0j)e02  and O,eQ, 
U(o1(g'  ,  (0i,  OM))  +  Oj) +  P V(crjg-',  (0,  O)) 
U(cT,(g'',  (0i,  O,))+0j)+flV(o]I  g'  (0,,  0,)).  (3) 
In constraint  (2), given that 0, and Oj  are the endowments  the two agents receive 
at date t, and reported  history up to date t -1  has been gt-l,  on the left-hand side 
of  the  inequality, -oc,(gt-', (0i, Oj))  +0i  is  agent  l's  current consumption and 
U(cog',  (0i, Oj)) his future utility if he and agent 2  both report truthfully,  today 
and  from  tomorrow  on.  On  the  right-hand  side  of  the  inequality, 
-aot(g'',  (Ok, Of))  + 0i  is  agent l's  current consumption and  U(olg'',  (Ok, Oj)) his 
future utility, if agent 1 cheats by reporting Ok rather than Oi, given that agent 2 
reports  honestly O0  and that they both will report  truthfully  from tomorrow  on. Hence 
by Definition 3, incentive compatibility  means that, at any date, given any reported 
history, if one agent chooses to adopt the truthful reporting  strategy  from that date 
on,  then the  other cannot benefit from any  one-period misrepresentation  at  that 
date. Note that although feasibility  will guarantee  that the "truth reporting"  current 
consumptions  -cr,(g'-  1, (0i,  Oj)) + Oi and  cr,(g'-1,  (i, j))  -  Oj are  non-negative,  it  may 
still be the case that the "deviating"-off the equilibrium  path-current consumptions 
-at(g',  (Ok,  Oj)) + Oi and  ct(g'',  (0i,  Ol)) + Oj take  on  negative values.  This  is  why 
we required  for mathematical  convenience  that the utility function u be defined  on the 
whole real line. 
We are now in a position to define  constrained  efficiency.  We say that a feasible  and 
incentive  compatible  contract  a  is efficient  if it maximizes  the ex ante expected  utility of 
agent 1, denoted  by U(o), subject  to delivering  a given ex ante expected  utility, denoted 
V(cr),  to agent 2. Formally, 
Definition  4.  A co-insurance  contract  a  is constrained  efficient  at V if it maximizes 
U(a) subject  to constraints  (1), (2), (3), and 
V(o) = V.  (4) 
To close this section,  we note that following  the literature,  we only look at contracts 
which implement  truthful  reporting  strategies.  We also note that here, as in Green, and 
Atkeson  and Lucas,  we do not impose  that each agent  be entitled  an expected  utility  that 
is at least as high as the autarkic  expected  utility at any ex post date. We leave this 
type of enforcement  issue aside to focus on the issues of private  information  and budget 
balancing. 
3. EXISTENCE  OF THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT 
Obviously,  the efficient  contract  defined  in Definition  4 does not exist for all values  of V. 
In this section,  we solve the problem  of existence  by establishing  that an efficient  contract 
at V exists if and only if V is in some compact  set we call (Dv.  We also develop  notations 
and a fixed point argument  that will prove useful in the later sections. WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  581 
Let 1D  be the set of feasible  and incentive  compatible  expected  utilities: 
=_  {(U(u),  V(o)) eR2Rl  a s.t. (1), (2), and (3)}  . 
Set D is non-empty  because  the autarkic  contract  is always  feasible  and incentive  compat- 
ible. D is also bounded.  We shall show that 1D  is compact  and is a fixed point of a one- 
step operator.  To this end, we borrow from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti  (1990) the 
concept of "self-generation"  as our major  mathematical  tool. 
Let v  be any non-empty  and bounded set in R2. Let  "[U(Oi,  Oj)](Oi  ,O)Ee2. Call 
0&:  E2-+R2 a  continuation value  function  with  respect  to  P  if  &(Oi,  Oj)= 
(U(0i, Oj), V(Oi,  Oj))e'P, for all (  js, 01)ee2. 
Definition  5.  Given  ',  a pair (s, 0?) is said to be admissible  to '  if V?  is a continua- 
tion value function  with respect  to  I,  and the following  conditions  are satisfied: 
_0j <  C(Oi,  0j)  < Oi,  V(Oi,  Oj) C  2;  (5) 
V(Oi, oj)ee2  and VOkee, 
U(-uC(0,  OJ) +  Oi) +  P+U(Oh,  O1) _U(-(Ok,  Oj) + Oi)  + PU(Ok,  OJ);  (6) 
and, V(Oi, Oj)e()2  and VO,e(, 
u(cr(O,,  Oi)  + O0)  + p V(O, Oj)  _ u(U(0,, 0,) + 0j) + P V(0,, 0,).  (7) 
Note that the constraints  in the above definition  are the one-step  analogues  of con- 
straints  (1), (2), and (3) in the previous  section.  Specifically,  (5) is feasibility,  and (6) and 
(7) are incentive  compatibility.  Now for any given (s,  1), which  is admissible  to I, define 
the one-step  expected  utilities  generated  by this pair by 
Of(w,  &) =  V1(t K  ),  42Kt  0&)), 
where 
of  I(W 0&)  =  r  E  r  gf[U(-  c(Oi,  Oj)  + oi)  + P  U(Oi, Oj)], 
e2Kt  O&)  I=  ??j  [U(Uf(i,  0j)  + 0j)  + p V(Oi,  091 . 
If we let L'(02;  R2)  denote the space  of bounded  functions  mapping  from  2  to R2, then 
function  ,:  RE2 x L  (02;  R2)  --R2 which  is defined  above is continuous  when  the product 
space R2x  L(2;  R2) is endowed with the proper product topology. Further,  define 
operator  B stepwise  in the following  way: 
B(P)_  {&Q(W,  V)I (W,  0&)  admissible  to T}. 
Note that the operator  B which maps from the collection  of all non-empty  and bounded 
sets in R2 to R2, is non-empty,  bounded  valued,  and monotone  in the sense  that I,  C'P2 
implies  B(' 1)  '  B(T2). 
Following  Abreu,  Pearce  and Stacchetti  (1990),  T is called  self-generating  if T c B(T), 
i.e. if its image  under  operator  B contains '  itself. In the appendix  we show in Lemma  1 
that if '  is self-generating,  then B('P)  '  D. We also show in Lemma  2 that (  itself is self- 
generating.  With these lemmas,  we can then establish: 
Proposition  1.  (i) (  is compact.  (ii) (D= B((D  ). 
Corollary  1.  (i) (D=  {  VeRI there  exists U such  that (U, V) ec}  is compact.  (ii) For 
all Ve(D,  (D(V)  = { UeRI (U, V)  (D}  is compact. 582  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
The proof of Proposition  1 is in the Appendix.  The proof of Corollary  I is a straight- 
forward  exercise  using the first  part of Proposition  1. What Corollary  1 tells us is that an 
efficient  contract  exists for any V in a compact  set (Dv.  Given that there  is not a feasible 
and incentive-compatible  contract  for any V outside the set (D,  we can then conclude 
that an efficient  contract at V exists if and only if  Ve Dv. Finally, the second part of 
Proposition  1, which states that D is a fixed point of B, is a useful result  for analysis  in 
Section 6 when an algorithm  for computing D is developed. 
4. A BELLMAN EQUATION 
Given Corollary  1, we can usefully  define  function U*: Dv-+R in the following  way: 
U*(V)-max  U,  VVe-D. 
UecI(V) 
That is, given  that agent  2 receives  an expected  utility V, U*( V) is the maximum  expected 
utility of agent 1 that can be achieved  by a feasible  and incentive-compatible  contract. 
Our aim is to show that U* is a fixed  point of a mapping  that we now seek to define. 
Let  C(V)=[of(0j,  Oj)(V),  V(0j,  ,j)(V)](o,'0,)e02,  for  all  VeDv.  Let  U:(v-*R  be 
any bounded  function.  Given U, for all VeDv, let 
4(C( V),  U) =E  7riKj[u(-of(0i,  0,) + Oi)  +P3U( V(0i, 0j))], 
for all C(V) such that the following  constraints  are satisfied:  V(0j, O,)E 0 2, 
-Oj <  ?(0i,  Oj)(V) <  O?,  V(0j, Oj)(V)et-v;  (8) 
V(0,, Oj)E02  and V0kE0, 
U(-cr(0,,  0j)(V)+  Oi)+  I  U(V(0i,  0j)(V)) 
_ U(-C(Ok,  Oj)(  V)  +  0,)  + /U(  V(Ok,  0j  )( V));  (9) 
V(0j,  Oj)E02  and V0OeO, 
u(cr(0,,  O)(V)+  0)+f3V(0i,  O)(V)?u(Cr(0,,  0,)(V)+Qj)+fBV(0i,  0,)(V);  (10) 
and 
E(oi'i  Cje2  ri 7j  [U(Cr(0i,  Oj)(  V)+  Oj)+  P  V(0j,  0  )( V)]  =  V.(ll 
Condition  (8) requires  that C(V) be feasible.  Constraints  (9) and (10) require  that C(V) 
be incentive  compatible,  given U. Constraint  (11) is the one-step  analogue  of (4) which 
promises  that expected  utility V be delivered  to agent  2. Now define  an operator  T, which 
maps from bounded  functions  to bounded  functions,  as follows. Given function U, let 
ROW)( ) = sup 4(C( V),  CU), VVc-(v, 
where C(V) satisfies  constraints  (8) through  (11). 
Proposition 2.  T(U*)(V)=  U*(V),for  all  VeDv. 
A proof of Proposition  2 is in the Appendix.  The following lemma states that the 
"sup"  in the Bellman  equation  is actually  attained. 
Lemma 3.  T(U*)(V)=maxc(v)  4(C(V),  U*),for  all  VeDv. WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  583 
A  proof  of  Lemma 3  is  in  the  appendix. Now  let  C*(V)=[uf*(0i,  Oj)(V), 
V*(Oi,  Oj)(V)](6,IO6),02.  Call C*= {C*(V): C*(V)  argmaxc(p)  4(C(V), U*), VeDvl an 
efficient allocation rule,' where {u*(0i,  Oj)( V): (0,  Oj)E02,  VeDvl  is the efficient trading 
scheme  and {V*(0i,  0j)(  V):  (0i,  Oj) e02,  Ve1V}  is the optimal  law of motion of the state 
variable.  We say that an efficient  allocation  rule C* can generate  a contract  a, (or a can 
be generated  by C*), if for all t> 1, h'-'eH'-',  and (0i,  oj)e02, 
at(ht  - I, (0i, OM)  = U*(Oi,  Oj)(  V(aj  ht'-)), 
V(ajh'-', (0,, Oj))= V*(0i, Oj)(V(oih'-')), 
U(alh'-',  (0,,  Oj)) =  U*( V*(0i,  Oj)( V(alh'-  ))). 
The following  lemma  establishes  in some loose sense an equivalence  relationship  between 
efficient  allocation  rules  and efficient  contracts. 
Lemma 4.  (i) Let af be an efficient contract. Then there exists an efficient allocation 
rule C* that generates a.  (ii) Let C* be an efficient allocation rule. Then  for all  VeDv,  an 
efficient contract a  can be generated by C* such that V(u) = V. 
A formal  proof of Lemma  4 is left for the reader.  Due to (ii) of Lemma  4 then, to 
solve for an efficient  contract,  it is sufficient  to solve for an efficient  allocation  rule  which 
in turn amounts to  solving the Bellman equation. For illustrative  purposes, we now 
describe  briefly  how the contract  a that is generated  by C* in (ii) of Lemma  4 works.  Let 
VO  be the ex ante expected  utility of agent 2. Suppose,  at date 1, Oi  and Oj  are reported 
respectively  by the two agents.  Then the contract  says that U*(Oi,  Oj)(  VO)  amount  of the 
consumption  good is to be transferred  from agent 1 to agent 2. In the meantime,  the 
contract  also determines  that, from date 2 on, agent 2 is entitled  to an expected  utility 
V,  =  V*(Oi,  Oj)(VO).  Now as the two agents move to date 2, suppose Oi and Oj are 
reported, then  a*(Oi,, Oj)(VI) will  be  transferred  from agent  1  to  agent 2,  and 
V2  =  V*(0i,,  Oj)( V1)  will be promised  to agent  2 as his expected  utility  from  date 3 on. In 
this way the contract  rolls forward  date by date. Notice that here the expected  utility of 
agent 2, V, is acting as a state variable  to summarize  history.  At the beginning  of each 
date t, nothing but V,_, matters,  for today and for the future. 
We now go on to derive  a characterization  of an efficient  allocation  rule.  The  following 
proposition says that no matter  what agent 1 reports,  agent 2 should receive  a smaller 
transfer  of current  endowment  from agent 1, and be entitled  to a higher  expected  utility 
from tomorrow  on, if he reports  a higher  endowment.  Similarly,  if he reports  a lower 
endowment,  then he should receive  a larger  transfer  from agent 1 and be entitled to a 
lower expected  utility from tomorrow  on. 
Proposition  3.  Let C* be an efficient  allocation  rule. Then  for all VcDv, if  ok-<?i 
and 0?< 0j,  then 
Vf*(0k, Oj)(V)  < Vf*(0i, Oj)(V)  <  V*(Oi,  01)(V), 
V*(Oig  01)(V) _ V*(Oig  Oj)(V)  _ V*(Ok,9  Oi)(V)g 
U*(  V*(0Ok  O;)(  V))  <- U*(  V*(Oig O;)( V))  -< U*(  V*(0;i  t01)(  V)). 
1. This  terminology  is borrowed  from  Atkeson  and Lucas  (1992)  but  used  here  in a slightly  different  sense. 584  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
A proof  of Proposition  3 is in the appendix.  To fully  characterize  an efficient  allocation 
rule, it is desirable  that the Bellman equation in Proposition  2 be solved analytically. 
Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall  (1990), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) have shown 
that,  for some  special  forms  of the utility  function,  (exponential  utility  functions  in particu- 
lar),  it is possible  to derive  closed-form  solutions  to their  Bellman  equations.  This,  however, 
is difficult  here. There are two reasons,  each can be viewed as a unique feature  of our 
Bellman  equation, compared  to those in related  models. First, in the Bellman  equation 
here, there are explicit upper and lower boundaries  for the net transfers,  o(O,, Oj)(V), 
whereas in the Bellman  equations of Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), and 
Atkeson and Lucas (1992) for the exponential  utility  case, there  is not a boundary  on an 
individual  agent's  consumption.  Second, and more important,  in our Bellman  equation, 
the value function U*(  ) enters into not only the objective  but also both sides of the 
incentive  constraints. 
5. FURTHER CHARACTERIZATIONS  OF THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT: 
THE CASE OF TWO ENDOWMENT VALUES 
In this section, we present  two propositions  to further  characterize  the efficient  contract 
without  solving  for it analytically.  For tractability,  we focus on the case where  the endow- 
ment takes on only two values, i.e. n = 2 and 0=  {0,  02}.  First, we show in Proposition 
4 that a contract  where  agent 1 transfers  a constant  amount of the endowment  to agent 
2 in every  period  cannot  be efficient.  A corollary  of Proposition  4 hence  is that the autarkic 
contract  is dominated  by an efficient  contract. 
Proposition 4.  The contract & where a, =  c, c being a constant,for all t is not efficient. 
A constructive  proof of Proposition  4 is in the appendix.  The rest of this section is 
devoted to looking at the long-run  behaviour  of the two agents' expected  utilities. To 
motivate  our result,  note that a central  proposition  in Green (1987) is that the long-run 
distribution  of expected  utilities  across agents is degenerate:  for each individual  agent in 
the population,  his expected  utility converges  to negative  infinity  with probability  one. 
Green  assumes  that his agents  have an exponential  utility  function.  Thomas  and Worrall 
(1990) in their single-agent  model show that for a family of utility functions  which are 
not bounded  from below, the agent's  expected  utility also converges  to negative  infinity 
with probability  one. Atkeson and Lucas (1992) show that in cases in which the utility 
function  of the agents takes either  the logarithmic  form, the CRRA form, or the CARA 
form, the expected  utility of any individual  agent converges  to the minimum  level in the 
set of possible  expected  utilities  with probability  one. This type of result,  however,  does 
not apply here. First, here by assuming  that a feasible  contract  never takes away from 
any agent  more  than  he receives,  the two agents  in our  model  will  never  consume  a negative 
amount of endowment.  This implies  that their expected  utilities  are essentially  bounded 
from below, although  the two agents  here may have the same unbounded  utility  function 
as the agents in, for example,  Green (1987) have. This certainly  rules  out possibilities  for 
the expected  utilities  of the two agents  to converge  to minus  infinity.  Further,  given that 
in our model we have identical  agents and they are constrained  to consume the entire 
aggregate  endowment  each date, it is also unikely  that their  expected  utilities  will converge 
to the minimum  in the expected  utility possibilities  with probability  one. Our aim in the 
rest of the section  is to show that the expected  utility  of each agent actually  converges  to 
every expected utility, including  the minimum,  in (Dv  with probability  zero. This will WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  585 
guarantee  that the long-run  distributions  of expected  utilities  of the two agents are not 
degenerate. 
Let Vo-Dv be any arbitrary  ex ante expected  utility that the constrained  efficient 
contract  would promise  to agent 2. Let V,(t  ?1)  be the random  variable  representing  the 
expected  utility to which agent 2 is entitled  at the end of date t. 
Proposition  5.  Prob {lim,,  V,= V}=O,  for all V-Dv. 
Proof.  Let {v,},  2 be any time-series  (or path) of agent 2's expected  utilities  that 
has the following  property 
lim v,  = V.  (12) 
to-.o 
For each v,, let {ur*(Oi,  Oj)(v,),  V*(Oi,  Oj)(V,)}(6,6  )EO2  be the one-step  profile  of the con- 
strained  efficient  contract  at the state V= v,. We show for the first step of the proof that 
either  of the following two inequalities  must hold: 
lim V*(0O,O  )(v,)#V,  (13) 
lim V*((0, Oi)(v,)  # V.  (14) 
Suppose  not and lim,O  V*(OI,  O)(v,) = lim,,  V*(O,, 0 )(v,) = V. Then, since 
V*(^9n  ^1)(Vt)<V*  (^i,  ^j)(Vt)<V*  (01,0,  )(Vt),  V(^9i,  ^j)C(  0 
2 
for all v,, it is immediate  that 
lim  V*(Oi,  Oj)(Vt)=  V,  V(Oi,  0j)e02.  (15) 
tr 
Apply this to the incentive  constraints  for agent 2 in the Bellman  equation  to yield 
lim [Uf*(Oi,  0j)(v,)  - U*(Oi,  Oj,)(V,)]  =  ,  V(O9E  O9j), (^9i,  O9j,)  e(2. 
Since  for each (0,,  01j)e02,  the sequence  {u*(0i,  Oj)(v,)}I'=1  is bounded  and  hence  contains 
a convergent  sub-sequence.  For convenience  we assume that this sub-sequence  is the 
sequence  itself. We therefore  can write: 
lim  a*(0i,  0j)(V,)=C,  V(0i,  1j)CE2,  (16) 
where  c is some constant  in [-0O, 0,]. Now notice that for each v,, 
vt = 
Z(O  O,)6e2  r1i  1rj  Ma*(Oi  Oj)(Vt)  +  0j)  + ,B  V*(01,  0j)(Vt)]. 
Let t- oo  and due to (15) and (16), the above will yield: 
1 
V= 
I  p  .Ee  0ffju(c+  Oj). 
This implies  that the contract  a' where  a' = c for all t is efficient,  contradicting  Proposition 
4. Therefore,  either (13) or (14) must be true. 
2.  Note  that  as is  standard we use the  upper case for the random variable and the lower case for its 
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We now proceed  with the second step of the proof. Suppose  (13) is true. Define two 
sub-sequences {xq}  and {y,}  of  {v,} be such that 
Xq= V*(O ,  ,On)(yq),  Vq.  (17) 
We show that {Xq} can not contain infinitely  many elements.  Suppose  the contrary,  then 
due to (12), 
lim xq= lim Yq  V. 
q-.co  q-+co 
However,  limqOO  Yq  = V and (17) together would imply limq-,  xq  X  V. due to (13)?. This 
is a contradiction.  Therefore  {Xq} can have at most finitely  many elements  and hence the 
path {v,} allows only finitely  many (01, O,) to occur. Such paths have a measure  zero. 
Supposing  (14) is true will lead us to the same conclusion.  11 
6. COMPUTING THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT 
As our discussion  in Section 4 indicates,  the complex nature of our Bellman  equation 
makes it difficult  to solve analytically  for an efficient  contract.  In order  to obtain greater 
insight  into the structure  of an efficient  contract,  in this and the next section,  we turn to 
pursue  a computational  approach.  As a first step, we explore  in this section two related 
algorithms  for numerical  computation  of an efficient  contract. 
Following  our analysis  in Section  4, the key to solving for an efficient  contract  is to 
solve for D, the set of admissible  expected  utility  pairs. Once 1D  is obtained,  then the set 
of admissible  states, i.e. the set of admissible  expected  utilities of agent 2,  Dv, and the 
value function of the Bellman  equation, U*(V), VcDv, are readily  computed.  Finally, 
solving the Bellman  equation  given (Dv  and U*( V) will yield the efficient  trading  scheme 
{u*(Oi,  Oj)(  V)}  and the optimal  law of motion of the state variable  { V*(Oi, Oj)(  V)}. 
The following  lemma,  which is in the spirit  of Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti  (1990), pro- 
vides an algorithm  for solving  for D. Basically,  starting  with a set WoC-V  R2 which is large 
enough,  and operating  on it iteratively  using the operator  B, we will then obtain  a mono- 
tone sequence  of sets converging  to D. 
Lemma 5.  Let  WO  be the space on which (U,  V),  the pair of expected utilities of the 
two agents, are allowed to take values, and assume B( WO)  C Wo. Let W,+, = B( W,),  Vt  > 0. 
Then { W,} is monotone decreasing and limr,  W,  = WOO  = (D. 
Here a natural  candidate  for W0  is [q, a] x [q,  d], where  a is the expected  life-time 
utility of the agent if he consumes  zero units of the consumption  good every  period,  and 
d is the expected  life-time  utility of the agent if he consumes  the aggregate  endowment 
every  period.  Of course  any set in R2 that contains  [q, d] x [a, d] will also do the job. 
To numerically  implement  the above  algorithm,  Wo  is not allowed  to take  on continu- 
ous values. We can assume that Wo  contains  N2 grid points uniformly  distributed  over 
the  space  [q,  a] x [q,  a].  That  is,  W=  {(Up,  Vq),  p, q=  l, 2,.  . . , N},  where  Up= Vp  = 
a+(d-a)(p-1)/(N-1),p=1,2,..  .,N.  To  obtain  W1=B(W0),  we  are essentially 
searching  over  Wo for  all  the  (Up, Vq)s where  there  exist  [(U(Oi, Oj),  V(0i,  01))e 
Wo](6,61)0E02, and [ur(Oi,  Oj)](e,0e  )e.02,  such that they satisfy  conditions  (5) through  (7) and 
Up  = E  7ri7rj[u(-cx(Oi,  Oj) + Oi) +flU(0i,  Q  )],  Vq= E  7r7rj[u(cx(0i,  Oj) +  Oj) +/3  V(0i,  Qj)]. 
3. Remember  that in (13) {v,} is any arbitrary  sequence  converging  to Vmn. WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  587 
Since  now we are dealing  with a finite  space  of possible  expected  utilities,  convergence  of 
the sequence  { W,} will occur after a finite  number  of iterations. 
A deficiency  of the above algorithm  however  is that the amount  of computation  that 
it requires  to reach  the solution  can be large.  At any (t + 1)th iteration,  given  the complex 
nature  of incentive  compatibility,  and that the space W,  over which  we search  for admis- 
sible expected utilities is two-dimensional,  a large number of nonlinear  programming 
problems  must be solved.  To reduce  computation,  we now proceed  to develop  an alterna- 
tive algorithm  by modifying  the one in Lemma  5. The idea here is to compute  the value 
function  of the Bellman  equation  directly,  without  having  to keep track  of the whole set 
of admissible  expected  utilities  0,  as we do in Lemma  5. 
Instead of covering  the whole space on which the pair of expected  utilities (U, V) 
takes on values with a grid, we now assume  that only V is restricted  to take values on a 
discrete  space containing  N grid points { V(K): K= 1, 2, . . . , N}, which are distributed 
over the interval  [q, a]. But for each V, U is allowed to take continuous  values on the 
closed interval  [a, a]. The following  proposition  lays out an algorithm  for computing  an 
efficient  contract  under  these assumptions. 
Proposition  6.  Let  (F?={V(K):K=1,2,...,  N}J.  Let  Uomin  (V)=a,  and 
U?max(V)  =  d,  Ve  ?D . Let (0 = {(U,  V)  Ue [  U%  in(V),  U%  ax(V)I,  VecD  ?}  . For t _ O and 
Vc-D , let 
S, + I  ( V) =  {E  i;rj [u(-  a(Oi,  0j) + Oi) + 0 U(Oi,  0A) I}, 
where [a(01,  Oj),  U(0j,  oj)](o,,o,)Ce2  is  such  that  there exists  [V(Oi,  Oj)](oj,oj)Ce2  so  that 
[c(Oi,  Oj), U(Oi,  ?j),  V(Oi, Oj)I(o,o,)6e2 is admissible to D, and satisfies the  following: 
E ri[7rj[M(U(O,  0j)  + 0j)  +  1  V(Oi,  O)]  =  V. 
Let 
(Dt+  I  = f((Dt)=  {U,  V) c- Dt Vc- Pt , St  + I(V):A0,  U-[ UtnI( V), Ut  X(  V)]  } 
where U+a( V) and Umtt  (  V) respectively are the maximum and minimum  values in the set 
S,t+(V).  Then, let 
(Dti'=  {Ve'Dvt  3Us.t.  (U,  V)E 
D,t+l}. 
Let  Iv  = limt,  IDt  ,  and  Umax(V)  =limt,oo  Utnax(V), V  VCI v.  If  T(U  ax)(V) 
UOax(V),  VVe(D,  then (Dv=  ID,  and U*(V) = Umax(V),  VVe-Iv. 
Proof.  We begin the proof by noticing several  simple  facts. First, B is monotonic 
and B(IDO)  s (Do. Second, B(')  s B(P),  V  TPeR2.  Third, the two sequences {D,}  and 
{D  I}  are  monotone  decreasing.  Fourth,  for all Ve D>, {  Um'ax(  V)} is monotone  decreasing 
but { U  in(V)} is monotone increasing. 
Given the conditions, we have: {(U'x(V),  V): VeIW}D'1'D, and it then follows 
immediately that O  I  'z(v,  and  U'ax(V)?  U*(V),  VVe-I05 
Now let { Wt} be the monotone sequence  of sets generated  by operating  B (rather 
than B) iteratively  on (Do.  Then 
D  c B()Dc  B(Po) = WI  B(fi(o) = 4) 588  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
By induction  it can be shown that in general, 
(D(- Wt  c-Ot,  Vt _0. 
But this implies  that TD vD  and U*(V)<  U'ax(V), VVe-(D  v 
1 
In Proposition  6, by allowing U to take continuous  values  leads to a large  reduction 
in the amount of search  over the grid points. At any (t + 1)th iteration,  we only search 
for admissible  expected  utilities  of agent 2 along a single dimensional  space P , whereas 
in Lemma  5, we were searching  over a two-dimensional  space W,  for admissible  expected 
utility pairs. However,  as is commonplace  in dynamic  programming  problems  where  the 
mapping  that defines  the Bellman  equation  is not a contraction  and uniqueness  of a fixed 
point of this mapping  is not guaranteed,  Proposition  6 as an algorithm  only works  when 
a certain  requirement  is satisfied.  Here  the key requirement  is that the function UOOax  must 
in fact be a fixed  point of operator  T. Obviously,  a sufficient  condition  for this is that the 
operator B preserves  convexity, in the sense that for all t and  V, (U1, V)e W, and 
((U2, V)e  iiW,  together will imply (a Ui + (1 -a)U2,  V)e  W,, Va e(0,  1). In this case, B and 
B will essentially  be equivalent.  Finally,  we note that although  the condition  that U'ax is 
a fixed  point of Tmay be hard  to verify  analytically,  it is straightforward  to check  computa- 
tionally  after the convergence  occurs. 
7. COMPUTING THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT: AN EXAMPLE 
For illustrative  purposes,  in this section  we solve numerically  a parameterized  example  of 
our model using the algorithm  provided  by Proposition  6. Assume  utility is exponential, 
i.e. u(c) = -exp (-c).  Assume B  = 0 96. Assume  the endowment  can be either  low or high: 
01= 0 2 and 02 =  0 4. The low and high  endowments  are  received  by each agent  with  equal 
probabilities:  7r,  =;2=0-5.  Assume that the expected  utility of agent 2 can only take 
values on a finite set that contains one hundred  grid points, {  V(l), . . .,  V(100)}, which 
are uniformly  distributed  over the interval  [a,  d], where a and a are as defined  in the 
previous  section. 
We find, for the efficient  contract,  (Dv=  { V(22),. . .,  V(84)}. That is, any expected 
utility which is below  V(22) or above V(84) is not achievable.  The value function 
U*( V(K)) is found to be concave  and monotone  decreasing.  The efficient  trading  scheme 
is  depicted  in  Figure  1.  Notice  that  U*(01,  02)(V(K))<ua*(0j,  Oi)(V(K))< 
a*(02,  01)(V(K)), i= 1, 2. Remember  that this is the property  we prove analytically  in 
Proposition  3, which  describes  the impact  of current  endowments  on current  trades.  Also 
notice  that  a*(0j, Oj)(V(K))  are  monotone  increasing in  K,  which  means  that 
c*(0i,  Oj)(  V(K)), and hence o*(0j,  0X)(  V(K))  + Oj,  which is the current  consumption  of 
agent 2, tends to increase  as K increases.  That is, agent 2 will receive  more transfer  of 
the consumption  good from agent I and hence consume more currently,  as his wealth 
accumulates.  Similarly,  agent l's current  consumption  -a*(0,,  Oj)(  V(K))  + O decreases 
as K increases.  Note that this is how history  affects  current  consumption. 
The optimal  law of motion of the state variable  is as follows: 
V*(O,  01)( V(K)) = V(K), K= 22,..  .,  84. 
V*(0i,  02)( V(K))  = V(K+ I  ), K= 22,..  ., 83; V*(H,, 02)( V(84))  = V(84). 
V*(02,  01)(V(K))=  V(K-1),  K=23,  .  . .,  84; V*(02, 01)(V(22))=  V(22). 
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FIGURFE  1 
Net Transfer  from  agent I to agent  2. '+'=ca*(Oi, O0)(V(K)),  '*'=  *(O1, 02)(V(K)),  "'='0r*(02,  01)(V(K)), 
'0=a*(02,  02)(V(K)). 
Notice that for all (0,, Oj), V*(0j, Oj)(  V(K)) is monotone  increasing  in K. Note that this 
is how history  affects  future  wealth: for given current  endowment  realizations,  the agent 
will be in a better  wealth  position tomorrow  if he is in a better  wealth  position today. 
The above law of motion of the state variable  indicates  that the expected  utilities  of 
each agent form a stationary  Markov  chain. This in turn implies  that the consumption 
process of each agent also forms a stationary  Markov  chain. To illustrate  graphically, 
Figure  2 plots an example  of the expected  utility paths of the two agents  who start with 
almost the same  ex ante expected  life-time  utilities  over a period  of 400 dates.  Notice that 
although the two agents have ergodic long-run  distributions  in expected  utilities, their 
wealth positions may still fan out temporarily.  Finally, Figure 3 plots the associated 
consumption  paths of the two agents. Notice the persistence  in consumption  that shows 
up in this figure. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper studies a model of dynamic  insurance  under private information  in a pure 
exchange  economy. There  are two infinitely-lived  agents in our model, both risk-averse 
and each having  an i.i.d. stochastic  endowment  stream  which  is unobservable  to the other. 
We give sufficient  and necessary  conditions for the existence  of a constrained  efficient 
contract.  We show that a constrained  efficient  contract  can be characterized  in a Bellman 
equation. An algorithm  for numerical  computation  of an efficient  contract  is discussed 
and an example  with exponential  utility is computed. 
Our model here is simple  and restricted.  For example,  there are only two agents in 
our model. One natural  extension  is to allow for multiple  agents,  and it is clear that the 
technical  approach  here is able to be modified  to confront  this situation.  Specifically,  in 
the case of N agents, an efficient  contract  can be defined  as one which maximizes  the 590  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
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FIGURE3  2 
Expected utility paths of the two agents: '-.' =expected  utility of agent  1, '-'=  expected utility of agent 2. 
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FIGURE  3 
Consumption  paths of the two  agents. Top  panel: consumption path of agent  1. Bottom panel: consumption 
path of agent 2. 
expected  utility of the Nth agent, subject  to delivering  a given vector  of expected  utilities 
to the rest N-  I agents.  For the Bellman  equation,  N-I  state  variables,  each  correspond- 
ing to the expected  utilities  of the N-  I agents,  will need to be defined. 
Other  extensions  of the model are also possible.  For example,  the only consumption 
good here is perishable,  it will be interesting  to see how savings  can be determined  in a WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  591 
bilateral  trading  context  by allowing  for storage  in our  model.  Of course  it is also important 
to understand  to what extent the efficient  allocations  in our model can be achieved  in a 
decentralized  environment  with price-taking  traders. 
APPENDIX 
Lemma 1.  If T  is self-gener  ating,  then  T c (D. 
Proof.  Let T  be self-generating and let V(h0)  =  ('  (h0), 
V 2(h0))eB(T).  We need to show that V(h0)eD, 
i.e., there exists a feasible and incentive-compatible co-insurance contract a(V(h10))  such that (U,  V)(f(Vi(h0)))  = 
V (ht). 
We  start  by  constructing  the  contract  ao((h0)).  By  the  definition  of  B(T),  there  exists  a  pair 
(r6(V(h0)), 91(V(h0))),  where  W'(VI(h0))  = [((V(h0))(0i,  Oj)J(ij),e2,  admissible  with  respect  to  T  such  that 
.(9'(y(h0)),  W(V(h0)))  = V(h?). Define, for all (0,,  0,)e&2,  that ao(h0, (0i,  0j)) = a(VI(h))(0i,  Oj). Then for any 
date I reported realization of endowments, say (0i,  0,),  let 
V (hl)  =  (ho,  (,  Oj  )) =,&  Vf  y(h))  (0,,  Oj) e T  c- B(T). 
Where the "e"  is due to the fact that 0&(V(h0))  is a selection from T  and the "c"  is due to the fact that T  is 
self-generating. 
Now  for  ii(hQ')eB(T) instead of  V(h0t)eB(T),  follow  the above procedure to  obtain  a2(h2) and  y(h/2). 
Repeat this for all t to obtain: 
ar(t  Vh))  =  {a (h'),  U2(h  ).  ,(h'), . . 
S( V  (h))=  {v (h)  V(h')  . . .  V(h'),  . . .}. 
We now demonstrate that S(VI((h)) is the sequence of expected utility vectors that the contract o(V(h0))  will 
generate for the two agents. Precisely, 
(U,  V)(o(V(hi0))Ih')  = V(h'),  t=O,  1,2.  (18) 
Note that if the above equation is indeed true, then it is easy to perceive that the co-insurance contract a(V(/h0)) 
is feasible, incentive-compatible and gives the two  agents the expected utility vector  y(h?),  as is desired. To 
show that (18) is true, observe that a simple fact from the above recursive construction of a(yV(h0)) is: 
o(V(h0))Ih'=oa(vV(h')),  t=O,  1, 2. 
Use this relationship to write: 
U(af(V(h1))=y  ?irji[u(-aj(ht  (0,  0j))  +  i) +fU(af(V(ht))jht?  (0,  Oj))] 
= y  ,rgr1[u(-oa,  (h,  (0i,  01)) + 0,) + /  U(o(v(h,  (0i,  (0,,))J- 
On the other hand, by the construction of  V(h?), we have: 
V"(h0  )=Z  ,'r, r,  [u(-of(V(h0))(0,,  Oj)+0i)+fPU(i((h0))(0,,  0))J 
= E  iri i,  [u(-  or (ho, (0,  qj )) + 0i)  + P v  (ho, (0i,  Oj ) 
Therefore, 
I  V(h  )-  U(-(v'(1h))I  flZpff,r,  Iv('(h0, (0,, 0,))-  U(o(f(h0,  (0,,  0,))))j 
<,s  sup  IV  I(h0,  (0i, Oj))  -  U(v( '(h0, (0i, 0,))))I 
<,s'  sup  I  (h  (0i, 0j)) -  U(a(V(h  (  0  ))))I. 
Note  that  the  above  is true for all  t>1  and all h'--'ceH'--'.  Now  let  t-.oo.  Since O<,B<1  and utilities are 
bounded, it is immediate that  yV'(h0)  = U(a(V)(h')),  Vt>0.  Therefore half of  (18)  is proven. In the same way 
we can show the other half to be true. 
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Proof  Let 0 = (4', 02)  I  (.  We need to show that 4)e B(F).  By definition of (,  there exists a co-insurance 
contract cr(4 ) such that (U,  V)(cr(o))  =  b, or equally, 
0'=  irigrj[u(-o,()0)(h?, (0,,  Oj)  + 0j) + PfU(c(0))h0,  (0,,  Oj))J, 
'2=Z 7r,  ij  r[u(.I(4)(1  A,  (0,,  O) +  O)j)  +/P V(a(o))Ih,  (0s, 0,))]. 
Define  a  pair  (',  q/)(4)  such  that  for  all  (  js,  1)eE2,  o(4)(0j,  0j)=ac(0)(h0,  (0j, Oj)),  U(4)(0i,  '0)= 
U(cr(O)l)hD,  (0,,  Oj)), and V(0)(0,  Oj)  =  V(cr(O)lf/to,  (0,,  Oj)). It is then obvious that (',  4)(O)  thus constructed 
is feasible and incentive compatible in the one-step sense defined by constraints (5),  (6) and (7), and also gives 
the vector of expected utilities (4',  42)  to the two agents.  11 
Proof of Proposition 1.  (D  = B(dP) is an immediate consequence of Lemma I and Lemma 2. The proof for 
the compactness of (  takes two steps. We first show that if TP  is closed, then B(T)  is closed, too. In other words, 
B preserves closedness. Let 'P be closed and let sequence  {V,,)}  C  B(T)  be such that lWn  ty, as n-.  oo  .  By the 
definition of B(T),  there exists a sequence {(If,  (&,)}  with each element admissible with respect to  P such that 
4( W,. '  V.)  =  V,,, Vn.  Since the  space of  all  admissible pairs with  respect to  T' is bounded,  I(('7,,  )}  has  a 
convergent subsequence (;qS  ,,,) -+  (f,  W),  as q-+oo. But 9( W,  V)  is continuous in ('4,  1), we have e( W,  qi) = 
limq_  oo  g4(qq 
, 94,,) =  lim,,-  ,;  V,, =  tg.  Left to be shown are: (a)  1' is a continuation value function with respect 
to T;  and (b)  ('4,  1) satisfies equations (5)  through (7).  To show (a),  simply notice that since 0/4,(0,,  Oj)e'P, 
V(0,,  Oi)Ce2,  and '  is closed,  we have  1(0,, Oj)  =limq  ,  ",'(0i,  O), V(0i, 0_)e02.  (b) is obvious.  Therefore 
we have shown that  yipeB(T), and hence B(T)  is closed. 
Now  we can proceed with the second step of the proof.  We need only show that (D is closed since it is 
certainly bounded. Let (F be the closure of (D. By definition, (F  c  (F.  Since the operator B is monotone increasing, 
we thus have B(D) 5 B((f).  But B(D) = (D, therfore (Dc B(F).  Now  since  D is closed,  by the result of the first 
step of the proof then, B(D)  is also closed. However, since (F is the smallest closed set containing (D, it must be 
the case that  FD  O  B(dD),  that is, (F is self-generating. Therefore by Lemma 1, B((F)  c(,  implying  1D(.  Hence 
we have shown that (F  =(F,  or (F is closed.  11 
Proof of Proposition 2.  Fix  V. Let C(V)  be such that (C(V),  U*) meets (8),  (10),  (11), and 
U(-o(0,,  Oj)(V)  + Oi)  + PU*( V(0i, 03)(V))?u(-cr(0i,  0,)( V) + O,)+PU*( V(0,,  Oi)(  V)). 
To show  T(U*)(  V) .  U*(V),  we need only show that there exists a contract a  which is feasible and incentive 
compatible  and  is  such  that  V(cr)= V,  and  U(cr)= T(U*)(V).  Now  for  each  (0,,  1)e&2,  since 
(U*(V(Bi,  Oj)(V)),  V(0,, Oj)(V))e(D,  there exists a feasible and incentive-compatible contract air such that 
U(at)  =  U*(V(Oi,  0j)(VA)  r(a#)=  z(s,,  j)(v),  V(O,,  j)eE)62. 
We can then let the contract a=  {c,(h')}  be constructed in the following way: 
a(ht?,  (0j,  0,))-a(O,,  Oj)  (V),  alho,  (0j,  0)  =j  (  0)L=2. 
We now proceed to show that  U*(V)?  T(U*)(V).  For all  U(ar)e(D(V),  we have 
U(ca)  Y ri  7rj[u(-aI(h10,  (0,,  0j))+0,)+flU(crh?,  (0i,  Oj))] 
and 
V=E  7ri7r[u(cfl(h10,  (0i,  0j))+0j)+flV(5ajt?,  (0i,  Pj))], 
where {oa(h0, (0,,  Oj)), U(orlh;, (0,,  Oj)), V(orhh, (0,,  Oj))}(o,.o,)4e satisfies (1),  (2),  and (3).  But by definition 
of  U*(V), 
U(alll?,  (0i,  0j))_<  U*(  V(vl0t?  (0i,  0m).) 
Therefore for all U(r)E(D( V), 
U(cr)?  ri7rj  [u(-FI(h,  (0i,  I0))  + ui) + pU*(  V(ovlio, (0i,  0j)))I 
=<sup  4(C(V), U*) 
C(M 
= T(U*)(V). 
Thus taking the maximum across  U(a)  yields U*(V)=maxu(,).4,(v  U(a)  ?T(U*)(V).  I WANG  DYNAMIC INSURANCE  593 
Proof of Lemma 3.  Fix  V. Since  I( V) is compact, there exists a contract a*  such that U(a*) = U*( V). 
Then [a,(h?,  (0i,  0O)), V(o*lho, (0i,  0j))J(6  ,0)62eargmaxc(v)  4(C(V),  U*). 
Proof of Proposition 3.  Fix  V. Fix  0, and 0,.  Let 01< 0j.  Manipulate agent 2's incentive-compatibility 
constraints  to get 
U(a*(0i,  Oj)(V) + 0X)  -  u(a*(0i,  0,)(V)  + 0j) ?fP[ V*(0i,  0,)(V)  -  V*(0i,  0,)(V)J, 
u(a*(0,,  01)(  V) + 01)  -  U(a*(0i,  Oj)(  V) + 0,) ? PJ V*(01, 0 )( V) -  V*(0i,  0,)( V)J. 
Adding  these two inequalities  yields: 
U(a*(0i,  O0)(  V) + 0 ) -  U(a*(0i,  01)(  V) + O0)  _ U(a*(0i,  O0)(  V) + 0,) -  U(a*(0i,  0,)( V) + 01). 
Define  function  f: R+  -.R  as follows: 
f(0)  = u(a*(0i, 0,)( V)  + 0) - u(af*(0i,  0,)( V)  + 0). 
Then we have:  f (0,) _ f (,).  Suppose,  by way of contradiction,  that a*(Ot, Oj)(  V)  > a*(0,, 0,)( V), then 
f'(0)  = u'(a  *(0i,  Oj)(  V)  + 0) -  u'(a *(0i,  0,)( V)  + 0) < 0. 
Since 0,< 0j,  f(01) >f(Oj),  we have a contradiction. Therefore a*(0i,  0O)(V) <a*(0i,  0,)( V) must be the case. 
Applying  this result  to the first  inequality  in this proof, it is immediate  that V*(0i, 0,)(V) < V*(Oi,  0,)(V). In 
almost  the same  way the remaining  parts  of the lemma  can be shown  to be true.  11 
Proof of Proposition  4.  We prove the proposition  by constructing a feasible  and perfectly  incentive 
compatible  contract  which strictly  improves  upon contract  a'  in the Pareto  sense. Without  losing generality 
assume  c _ 0. Let 3e(  [0,  02 -  cl and let As [O,  cl. Construct  a contract  called a(b, A) in the following  way. 
For t= 1, let or(3,  A)(g9,  (02,  01))=c+6,  and a,(6,  A)(g9,  (0i, 0O))=c, for (0i,  O,)?(02,  01).  For t=2, 
let U2(6,  A)(g2)=  c-A,  if g'=(go,  (02,  01));  otherwise U2(6,  A)(g2)=c.  Finally, for t_  3, let a,(6,  A)(g')=c,  for 
all g'eH'. Obviously,  then, a(0, 0) is just 'c.  Note that for all 3 and A the contract  a(6, A) thus constructed 
is certainly  feasible,  and it is also temporarily  incentive  compatible  at all the dates t>2.  We now proceed  to 
show  that  by choosing  the  magnitudes  of d and  A properly,  a(6, A) can be made  temporarily  incentive  compatible 
at date I as well and satisfy  the desired  Pareto  dominance  requirement. 
A  K, 
F,  =0 
A  E, 
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It is straightforward  to show that cr(3,  A) is temporarily  incentive  compatible  at date I if and only if the 
following  inequalities  hold: 
F,(3,  A) = u(-c-36  + 0X)  +f[rIu(-c  +  A  +01)  + r2u(-C+A+02)J 
-u(-c+  01)  -/[iru(-c+  01)+n2U(-C+  02)  <0,  (19) 
F2(6,  A) = u(-c-  3  +  02)  +  P[7ru(-c+A+  9,)  +  r2u(-c+A  +  02)1 
-u(-c  +  02)-  P[7r,u(-c+  0,)  +  r2u(-c +  02)?>-0,  (20) 
G,(3, A) = u(c+ a + 0X)  ++P[ru(c-  A  +90,) + I2u(c-A+02)J 
-u(c+  01)- P[fJ  I u(c+ 01) +  7r2U(c+  02)]  <0,  (21) 
G2(3, A) = u(c+  3 + 02)  + P[rIu(c-A  + 09) +  r2U(c-A+  02)1 
-U(C  +  02)  -  P[rI  U(C  +  091)  +  r2U(C  +  02)1  >-?-  (22) 
And, a(3, A) strictly  dominates  autarky  if and only if either (20) or (21) holds in strict inequality.  let Q= 
{(3,  A)E[0,  0,121(6,A)  s.t. (19), (20), (21), (22)}. Notice that since F,(0,0)=G,(0,0)=0,  i=1,2,  we have 
(0, 0)eU. In the following  we will show that Ql  contains  a point at which  either  (20) or (21) holds with strict 
inequality.  To this end, we find that Q2  is characterized  by the following  facts: 
d  >0,  dA  >0,  i=1,2; 
d3  F)(8.A)=0  d3  G,48.A)=0 
d2  >A  d2  <0,  A=1,2; 
d3b  FI(.A)=0  d32  G,(.6A)=0 
dA  _dA  dA  _dA 
-b  |  -=  d-  -  = K, > K2= d  = 
d3  F1(O.O)  =O  d3  GI (O.O)= O  d3  F,(o.o)=o  a3  G2(0.0)  =O 
4With these facts in  hand, the  set  Q  is  depicted graphically  in  Figure 4.5  Obviously then, for  all 
(3, A)EQ--{A, E}, 6r(6,  A) strictly  dominates  autarky.  11 
4. To show these  facts, define  functions  a and y that map from  R to R as follows: 
a(x)  =  (l/fl)[(r,u'(x-c+  0,)  +  7r2u'(X-c  +  02)1--', 
7(x)  =  (1/f  )[r  I U'(X  +  C +  0  9)  +  r2U'(X  +  C +  02)] 
Then for i= 1, 2, we have: 
dA  =a(A)u'(c-3+90)>0, 
d3  F,4  A) = 0 
dA  = y(-A)u'(c  + 3 + 9,) > 0, 
d5  G(A)  O=0 
d2A  |  = -a(A)u"(--c-  6 +  9,) -  a(A)3'fu'(-c-  U3  +  9) 
d32  F,(,5A)=O 
x  [irIu"(-c+A+01)+  r2U"(-C+A+02)J>0, 
d2|  =  y(-A)u"(c  +  3 
+  0,)  +  y(-A)3pU'(C+ 
3 
+  09)2 
d3  G,(SA))=0 
x [7(lu"(c-  A + 01) +  r2U'(C-A  + 02)]  < 0, 
dA 
= a(O)u'(-c  + 0j), 
db  Fxo.o)  =o 
dA 
_  G|(O.O) ~ =  y(0)u'(c  + Oi).  db Go,o0*)  = 
It is straightforward  to verify  that a(O)u'(-c+ 9i)>  y(0)u'(c  + 0,). 
5. Note that the arrows  in the figure  point to the directions  that are consistent  with the inequalities  from 
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Proof of Lemma 5.  {  W,} is monotone  decreasing  because  B is mototonic  and B( WO)  c  Wo. To prove  the 
limiting  result,  first,  we show that the sequence  {  W,}  converges.  It is obvious  that B( WO)  c Wo. Now operate  B 
repeatedly  on both sides of this expression  to yield: W,+, = B( W,) c W,, for all t>0,  as the operator  B is 
monotone  increasing.  Therefore  {  W,}  is a bounded  and monotone  decreasing  sequence.  It converges  and in fact 
W, = lim,_  Wt  = C  o  W,. Second, we show that D  c W,, . Obviously, D  c W0.  Monotonicity  of B implies 
B(D) c B( WO).  But B((D)  =  D by Proposition  I and B( WO)  = WI by construction,  we thus have:  (D  c  W . Iterate 
the above procedure  to obtain: D  c W,, for all t _ 0. Therefore  b c WO.  Third,  we show that WOO  c-  (D.  By the 
construction  and  convergence  of {  W,},  B( Wv) = W,.  Therefore  WD  is self-generating.  By Lemma  I then, W, = 
B(W.,)C?--D  11 
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